This paper estimates the impact of recorded domestic property crime on property prices in the London area. Crimes in the Criminal Damage category have a significant negative impact on prices. Burglaries have no measurable impact on prices, even after allowing for the potential dependence of burglary rates on unobserved property characteristics. A one-tenth standard deviation decrease in the local density of criminal damage adds 1% to the price of an average Inner London property. One explanation we offer here is that vandalism, graffiti and other forms of criminal damage motivate fear of crime in the community and may be taken as signals or symptoms of community instability and neighbourhood deterioration in general
Introduction
Urban crime has a powerful influence on perceptions of area deprivation. Criminal damage to public and private property symbolises urban decay, and fear of burglary and theft promotes insecurity and anxiety. Crime prevention and control policy is top of the political agenda in developed countries, and these problems are particularly acute in the urban environment.
Although no place is crime-free, the fear of crime and the direct costs associated with property crime can have particularly severe consequences in urban areas, in discouraging local regeneration and catalysing a downward spiral in neighbourhood status. This 'tipping'
process has a prominent role in criminological explanations of community change and crime (Bottoms and Wiles, 1997) . Policy makers in Britain apparently share this view, arguing that "neighbourhoods have been stuck in a spiral o f decline. Areas with high crime and unemployment rates acquired poor reputations, so people, shops and employers left. As people moved out, high turnover and empty homes created more opportunities for crime, vandalism and drug dealing" (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001, p.7). Certainly, casual observation suggests that persistently high local crime rates deters new residents and motivates those who can to move out to lower-crime rate neighbourhoods. We would expect this demand for lowcrime neighbourhoods to be revealed in a property or land price gradient between residences in high and low-crime localities.
The evidence from the US based on hedonic models (Hellman and Naroff, 1979; Thaler, 1978; Lynch and Rasmussen, 2001 ) suggests that crime rates do affect property values, although the effects may be small below high-crime thresholds. Lynch and Rasmussen (2001) find that a 1% increase in violent crime rates reduces prices by 0.05%, but report positive associations of property crime rates with prices. This they attribute to higher reporting rates in wealthier neighbourhoods, but higher victimisation rates may provide a better explanation. Properties are heavily discounted in high-crime neighbourhoods. For the UK, however, there is no existing evidence on the relationship between urban crime and property values. We address this here by estimating the effect that crime rates have on property prices in the Inner London area, using spatial property crime data provided by the Metropolitan Police. Following the traditional hedonic literature, we interpret this as measuring households' marginal willingness to pay to avoid crime, or the implicit costs of crime.
One problem with existing studies is that identification relies on inclusion of an ad-hoc set of control variables at the household and neighbourhood levels. No attempt has been made to deal with the potential endogeneity of crime rates in a property value model. In this paper we deal carefully with this issue. We apply a semi-parametric regression approach that is useful for abstracting from unobserved price variation induced by access to local amenities and changes in the unobserved physical characteristics of property over geographical space.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out the empirical framework for our estimates, and goes into some detail on how we think we can identify the impact of crime density on property values. Section 3 discusses our data sources. Section 4 presents the results, and discusses their interpretation. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Model and Methods
Our task is to measure the impact that property-based crimes in the neighbourhood have on the price of residential property. But this highlights a general problem with the use of property value models to infer the implicit price of local characteristics that reflect the behaviour of local residents. Clearly, the behaviour of neighbours will depend on their individual characteristics, and these may well be systematically related to unobserved determinants of property prices. Consequently we may falsely infer a causal r elationship between local characteristics and property prices, when in fact it is the unobserved component of property values that drives neighbourhood composition. Consider this example: low local land prices attract low-income residents, and if low-income residents are prone to commit crimes in their own neighbourhood we will find more crime in low landprice neighbourhoods. Unless we can observe land prices, regression estimates of the impact of crime on property prices will be biased towards finding a negative relationship.
On the other hand, estimation of the implicit price of crime presents an additional problem. Burglars will target properties where the expected return in terms of the market value of stolen goods is highest. Since high land-price neighbourhoods will have high proportions of high-income residents, the returns to burglary in high land-price neighbourhoods will be high. We can expect to find high burglary rates in these areas, other things equal. To proceed, we must pay careful attention to the unobserved components of property values that are area specific, and attempt to control for these in our estimation technique.
To understand and tackle the problem, we need to structure what we are doing fairly carefully. We assume the following structure for the joint determination of crimes and property prices: (2) implies that crimes at the property or in the immediate neighbourhood and the property price are jointly determined.
In the crime equation, parameter ρ measures the dependence of criminal activity in the neighbourhood at a given property location on criminal activity in the surrounding district.
This might arise for instance through opportunistic burglaries or vandalism in a street by criminals targeting nearby areas. We allow for spatial correlation in crime rates, since this provides one potential source of identification, as we shall see below.
Identification of the impact of crime on property prices
As it stands, OLS estimation of the hedonic price function in (1) ( )
. This could invalidate our use of the spatial lags as instruments. However, as the 5 This is fine if we know what variables to include to get rid of ( )
and remove the residual spatial autocorrelation. The problem with this approach is that it is data intensive, and we need some prior assumptions about which amenities are important enough to warrant data collection. Moreover, proxying neighbourhood attributes with the characteristics of owner-occupying residents will lead to inconsistent estimates, because residents' characteristics are correlated with unobserved determinants of area property prices through sorting and selection processes.
If we do not have this information, the following transformation of (1) is useful. In the fashion of a standard fixed effects estimator, we work in deviations from the local spatial average of the variables (centred on observation i at coordinate i c ):
This transformation gets us out of having to specify a full model of price determinants, but means we no longer have a spatial lag instrument for property-specific crimes. One victimisation rates in commercial and residential premises will be related, except through shifts in the local supply of crimes. In Section 4.4 we consider another instrument, based on the link between alcohol consumption and crime -the distance to the nearest public house or wine bar.
Estimation
We use all the approaches described above to estimate β . Firstly, we use a fairly traditional specification with property characteristics, location descriptors and physical attributes of the neighbourhood on the right hand side of an OLS regression. Secondly, we use crimes on nonresidential properties as instruments for crimes at or near the property.
Next, we estimate the model of equation (3). To do this we need first to estimate As final checks, we use distance to nearest public house or wine bar as an instrument, then spatial lags of crime, and deviations in spatial lags as instruments.
Data Sources

Crime data
Many police forces in the UK record crime at a geographically localised level. However, it is nearly impossible to obtain this data at the present time in a form that is useful for mapping to other area characteristics and to properties. One exception is the Metropolitan Police Force for London, which has made available to us a unique data set recording property-based crime Ultimately, we will have to live with these data problems. No victimisation or other crime data exists at sufficient density, or at a useful level of geographical dis-aggregation. It is reasonable to assume that the recorded figures in our spatial data set can be treated as an index of the geographical distribution of the most serious incidents of property crime.
Property price data
Our main data source for property transactions is a sample provided by Ekins Surveyors.
Ekins is the trading name of Woolwich Surveying Services Ltd, a wholly-owned but independent subsidiary of Woolwich plc operating in the residential and commercial property 
Matching crimes to property locations
Most of the recorded crimes do not match property locations exactly, and it is not the intention here to measure attacks on specific properties. Rather, we are interested in obtaining a measure of the expected density of crime in the neighbourhood of a property -think of a few blocks or streets. For our property level data we calculate the number of crimes of each residential crime type recorded within a 250m radius of the property, and the implied density of crimes per kilometre squared. For non-residential crimes, we double the distance to compensate for the lower density of non-residential properties. When we match to our Postcode-sector level data, we measure crime density within a 1km radius of the Postcode sector centroid. Table 1 summarises the key variables in the property price and crime data. The top panel summarises the property valuation sample. The bottom summarises the Postcode-sector based data. The mean crime densities are much lower in the latter, because it covers a much wider geographical area and because, as we illustrate below, crime rates are lower in the suburbs.
Results and Discussion
Summarising and visualising the data
The focus of our work is on recorded crimes in the categories Burglary in a Dwelling, and
Criminal Damage to a Dwelling. Turning now to the property valuation data, Figure 3 shows the distribution of property prices over the London sample area. Comparing the maps for crimes and burglaries, we see that most of the high-density crime areas are in the east, and outside the highest price districts in the west. But this is not the relationship we want to measure. We need to abstract from these broad geographical trends. 50700  50900  51100  51300  51500  51700  51900  52100  52300  52500  52700  52900  53100  53300  53500  53700  53900  54100  54300  54500  54700  54900  55100 Figure 4 presents an estimated contour plot of the residual property price surface from our models in the London area, smoothed on to a 500m grid. This is an estimate of the function ( )
as it appears in (1) (for details of how this is constructed see Appendix A). Our semiparametric method in effect removes this spatial variation before estimating the linear parameters in the hedonic model. It is quite clear that no parametric function can be accurately fitted to this price surface. Any fully parametric property price regression that fails to control adequately for this spatial distribution of unobserved price factors will, in principle, provide inconsistent estimates of the model parameters.
Regression results using property level data
Let us begin though with standard OLS log-property price regressions. These results are shown in Table 2 , Column (1). Explanatory variables are dictated largely by what is available in our property data set. Column (1) includes a quadratic in the distance to Soho, London. This is an approximation to the Central Business District (CBD) 5 . The regression includes various measures of population and household density to adjust for the fact that we measure property crimes on a per-unit-area basis 6 . Crime density could proxy for housing and population density. For presentational reasons we do not report the coefficients on ten property style dummies. All the estimated parameters on the property characteristics and distance to the CBD seem plausible 7 .
Focussing now on our crime incidence variables, the first coefficients in Column (1) suggest a highly significant 3.9% decrease in property prices for an additional 5 reported incidents of Criminal Damage per square kilometre per year (10% of the sample mean, or an 5 Including alternative or additional measures -to the City of London, Victoria, or Docklands -made little difference to the key results, and introduced collinearity problems. 6 The alternative approach would be to calculate the impact of crimes per household. This would involve either additional computation of the number of households corresponding to our crime density measure, or division of the crime density by the housing density. Results based on this approach tend to be highly sensitive to the choice of area over which household density is computed, though qualitatively similar to what is presented here. An additional problem occurs, in that we have no sensible denominator for crimes on commercial premises. 7 The results shown are based on the maximal sample with basic property style indicators and at least some information on other characteristics. We zero-encode data elements in the property characteristics set with missing values and generate an additional missing data dummy for each variable.
expected 1 additional reported incidents per year within a radius of 250m Column (2) introduces more neighbourhood and amenity controls. Immediately, the coefficient on Criminal Damage is halved and the impact of Burglaries vanishes to insignificance. Column (3) instruments crimes on dwellings with the reported incidence of
Criminal Damage and Burglaries to other buildings. These IV estimates will be consistent even if victimisation rates depend on the characteristics of dwellings or households. In fact, the IV point estimate is slightly higher than the OLS estimate, but not significantly so using a standard Hausman test of exogeneity (
In any property value model we must worry about the impact of unobserved local amenities. Column (4)-(6) present results for our semi-parametric smooth spatial effects estimator that allows for unobserved spatially correlated effects on property prices. These are It is worth discussing the effectiveness of our semi-parametric strategy. That it works is clear from the coefficients on the distance from local amenities. Distance from London
Underground stations and distance from Council Offices (a measure of intra-urban centres rather than an amenity in its own right) were both significant at around minus 3% per kilometre in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 . Now they are not. This happens because we are effectively exploiting variation relative to surrounding neighbourhoods. Distances to anything but immediately proximate amenities will not matter. Working with differences from local averages eliminates distance-to-amenity-related variation and reduces the need for this type of control 9 .
Adding some more community characteristics into the regression, we find few dramatic changes. Table 3 presents the main crime coefficients, plus the coefficient on number of rooms, for three additional specifications. Including spatially weighted averages of local school performance and unauthorised school absences in the regression makes very little difference. Controls for ethnicity, education levels and unemployment rates have more of an impact, but as we have discussed before, these residential composition variables are likely to be endogenous. 9 Because the mean distance from an amenity to houses in a radius around a given house j is a consistent estimate of the distance from that amenity to j. If we work with the deviation of distance from local mean distance, then only amenities that benefit households because of their immediate proximity will matter in the regression: park and riverside locations perhaps. Taking deviations from the local group mean eliminates the impact of other local factors. Regressions are otherwise as in Table 2 , Column (5).
Restric ting the sample to observations with non-missing rooms data gives us a lower coefficient on the number of rooms, but increases the measured impact of incidents of criminal damage. The impact of burglary rates remains insignificant. We shall take Column (5) in Table 2 Treating criminal damage as an index of visible crime, we can say that a one-tenth standard deviation increase in crime density leads to a 0.94% decrease in property prices. Interpreting the coefficient as an implicit price in a hedonic function gives us a mean implicit price of around £2200 for a one-tenth of a standard deviation reduction in Criminal Damage incidents the Inner London area. We find no impact from domestic burglary rates, despite carefully attention to identification. For interpretation, read Section 4.5.
We have assumed so far that the response of log property prices to the density of crimes is linear. Figure 6 in Appendix C provides and informal check. It plots the deviation of log property prices from their locally weighted averages, against the deviation of Criminal Damage densities from their locally weighted averages. The relationship is predominantly linear.
Regression results using Postcode -Sector level data
The Postcode-sector characteristics, analogous to the neighbourhood measures used in Table 2 . Table 4 presents these results.
Column (1) is a simple OLS regression. What is clear here is that the Postcode sector average data does a pretty good job of measuring the impact of property crimes on property prices, taking our results of Table 2 , Column (4) as the comparison model. Overall though, the coefficients in Columns (1) and (2) mis-measure the implicit prices of a room, and social housing relative to our baseline. In Column (3) we work with deviations from locally weighted averages of the variables. This puts the implicit prices back in line with the baseline model. Comparison of Column (3) in Table 2 , and Column (5) in Table 4 , suggests that microgeographically aggregated data is quite acceptable for the hedonic analysis of neighbourhood and property characteristics, provided that we take the trouble to carefully account for unobserved neighbourhood effects.
Alternative instruments
In Section 2.1 we suggested using spatial lags of the crime density as instruments for neighbourhood crime density, on the assumption that averaged crime rates at some radius 10 from a property or neighbourhood should be unaffected by the characteristics of the property or neighbourhood. Using this strategy, we still fail to find any impact from Burglaries in Dwellings on property prices. This reinforces the impression that burglary rates really have no causal impact. The results are in the top panel of Table 2 . Rather than attenuating the impact of Criminal Damage, this strategy gives us bigger negative coefficients: -0.664 (-4.64) using data in levels; -0.680 (-4.02) using the data in deviations from locally weighted averages. As we discussed before in Section 4.2, this may be because the higher propensity of occupants of higher-price dwellings to report crime attenuates the non-IV coefficient. But it may also be because average crime density in the wider geographical area suffers from less measurement error and noise than the locally computed crime densities. Instrumenting corrects for errors-in-the-variables-induced attenuation.
Consideration of the possible cultural factors underlying graffiti, vandalism and other forms of criminal damage suggest another plausible instrument. Alcohol consumption is an associated factor in many types of crime, although the lack of official statistics for the UK makes it difficult to quantify the link (Deehan, 1999) . A study in one town in England found that 88% of people arrested for acts of criminal damage, over a period of five months, had been drinking in the four hours prior to the incident (Jeffs and Saunders, 1983) . Official statistics for local prisons in the United States indicate that 33% inmates convicted for a property crime, and some 56% of inmates convicted for a public order offence, had been drinking prior to the offence. Of those inmates, around three-quarters had a Blood Alcohol Content in excess of 0.10g/dl at the time of the offence (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998).
Although the link between alcohol consumption and crime is not necessarily directly causal, alcohol is often a contributory factor in violent crimes and acts of public disorder. This may be because alcohol encourages aggression, induces psychotic states, or decreases inhibitions.
Or it may be that some certain social environments encourage both excessive drinking and disorderly or criminal activity (Deehan, 1999; Bottoms and Wiles, 1997) . In any case, a link 10 In practice we use the locally weighted averages computed for each observation as in Section 2.2, but excluding any data points within a radius of 1km of the observation.
between the location of crimes and the location of licensed premises, and the time of offences and the end of licensing hours is widely recognised (Bottoms and Wiles, 1997). Regressions are otherwise as in Table 2 . IV regressions using pub distance as instruments include public house density as additional regressor in property-price equation, to allow for amenity effects. Note: 1. The instruments in this model fail the Sargan test for the validity of the overidentification (p-value=0.027). All others pass the test at a p-value of 0.200 or greater.
With these considerations in mind, we would expect the incidence of property crime in our London data to be higher at locations near licensed premises. Indeed this is true.
Regressing the criminal damage density at each property location on a 3 rd -order polynomial in distance from the nearest public house or wine bar, we find significant negative impacts (F(3,138)=6.43). For the average property, criminal damage density at a property decreases at the rate of 3.5 crimes per km 2 per year as distance to the nearest pub increases 11 . In the lower panel of Table 5 we employ distance to the nearest licensed premises, and its polynomials as instruments for criminal damage in our property price equation. Again, this instrumentalvariables strategy increases the estimated negative impact of criminal damage on property values, although the results are not far out of line with the IV estimates in Table 2 . The use of 11 Data on pub locations is from the web edition of the Thomson Local Directory, http://www.infospace.com/uk.thomw/. This result is based on a regression in deviations-from-spatial-means form, with additional controls as in Table 2. distance to nearest licensed premises as an instrument assumes that there is no direct amenity value from living close to a pub. This is questionable, though our instruments pass the appropriate tests once we allow for general, localised spatial effects. We include local pub density as an additional regressor, under the assumption that accessibility to a variety of drinking establishments is likely to be more important to consumers than close proximity to the nearest. This does have a positive impact on prices in the model with spatial effects -an additional 10 pubs or wine bars per km 2 increasing prices by 2.8%.
Interpretation and discussion
Burglaries do not seem to influence property prices, but Criminal Damage incidents do. This is, at first, quite surprising. True, home-owners can take preventative action against burglars (alarm systems, barriers) but may not be able to prevent damage to property. But we should consider to what extent our estimated impact of Criminal Damage to Dwellings picks up the cost associated with a high incidence of unobserved crimes -violent crime, robbery, vehicle crime for example.
Our data is slightly limited by the lack of information on crime in other categories.
Some unobserved crime categories are cause for concern, because the estimates of the economic costs of these types of crime are high. Brand and Price (2000) estimate that average cost associated with an act of violence against the person is £19000 with serious wounding carrying total costs of £130000. For robbery the figure is £9700 per incident. Clearly, we can expect the costs associated with increased risk of attack associated with a high persistent high local incidence of robbery or violent crime to be capitalised in property values. On the other hand, incidents of assault and robbery may be more important in individual choices about where and when to walk the streets. The location of property crimes is more directly related to choice of residential location.
Unfortunately there is not much data available that allows us to infer anything about the relationship between rates of crimes in different offence categories at a localised geographical level in urban areas 12 . We can do this at a much broader geographical level using recorded crime at the Police Force Area level for England and Wales. Police Force Areas correspond to Counties, with a few exceptions. Whether the cross sectional relationship tells us much 12 Crime data is collected at Local Authority Level, but not for the Criminal Damage category.
-25 -about the relationships between types of offences at the neighbourhood level is pretty doubtful. Nevertheless, the relationships between year-to-year changes in crime rates within
Police Force Areas will be informative about the links between different types of criminal activity. between 33% and 50% of respondents in owner-occupier neighbourhoods consider that disorder in general has a negative impact on quality of life and one in five respondents in affluent owner-occupier neighbourhoods perceive high levels of disorder.
Perhaps the most plausible interpretation of our results is that incoming residents We should also recognise that vandalism, graffiti and other forms of criminal damage are some of the most visible urban crimes. Uncleaned graffiti and unrepaired damage in the environment is hard to conceal from prospective house purchasers. Whilst sellers may have private information about local incidents of other crimes -by personal victimisation, word of mouth or 'Neighbourhood Watch' newsletters -this information is most likely unavailable prospective home-buyers. In London, information on neighbourhood crime rates is not readily available to the general public. This asymmetry in information means that the hedonic price function does not correctly reveal preferences over most types of crime. Hard-toobserve crimes will have a weak impact on property prices. 15 Almost all citations on the web are on community web-sites in the US, encouraging neighbours to clean up their lots.
Conclusion
We It is, on the face of it, surprising that prices respond more to acts of criminal damage than to burglaries given the apparent physical and emotional costs. The explanation we offer here is that vandalism and graffiti are important factors motivating fear of crime in the community, even though the evidence here suggests that these types of crimes are not strongly correlated with incidents of a more serious nature. More generally, graffiti and vandalism may be taken as signals or symptoms of community instability, disorder, lack of social cohesion and neighbourhood deterioration in general. 16 The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act established partnerships between the police, local authorities, probation service, health authorities, the voluntary sector, and local residents and businesses. is the standard normal density function. This means we are using a Gaussian kernel or distance decay function to weight neighbouring observations. Parameter k sets the maximum distance to the neighbouring observations that will used to compute these local weighted averages. Our estimator of ( ) Note that the choice of k determines the degree of smoothing. This defines how wide the neighbourhood is over which we compute the locally weighted averages. A higher value of k implies generates a longer spatial lag. The choice of k is somewhat arbitrary, but was found to make little difference in practice over a moderate range. Our baseline choice of k is such that the spatially weighted mean explains around one third of the variation in property 
